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Abstract
The effective delivery and continued advancement of health care is critically dependent on the relationship
between physicians and industry. The private sector accounts for 60% of the funding for clinical
research and more than 50% of the funding sources for physician education. The nature of the physician–
industry relationship and the role of the physician as a gatekeeper for health care make this association
vulnerable to abuse if certain safeguards are not observed. This article will review the current federal
guidelines that affect the physician–industry relationship and highlight several illustrative cases to show
how the potential for abuse can subvert this relationship. The recommendations and ‘‘safe harbors’’ that
have been designed to guide business relationships in health care are discussed.
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T he nature of physician–industry interactions hascome under increasing scrutiny in recent years.There is no doubt that the partnership between
physicians and industry has been mutually synergistic,
fostering scientific breakthroughs and enhancing the
educational experience of all physicians. However, this
partnership developed during a period in which the bio-
technology and pharmaceutical sectors reported record
profits. The increasing reliance of an aging population
on the federal government for health care, coupled with
a new prescription benefit program, has brought the
judicial arm of government regulation to the forefront of
the health care arena. In addition, some well-publicized
and dubious arrangements between physicians and
industry have called into question long-standing prac-
tices in the business of medicine.
The very existence of a financial relationship between
physicians and industry frames a duality that is not
unfamiliar in the field of medicine, but could easily be
viewed as harmful by an outside observer. Physicians
have a fiduciary responsibility to patients, yet medicine
itself is a business. Often a physician’s income is tied to
the level and amount of service provided. More impor-
tantly, while physicians have a responsibility to an indi-
vidual patient, they also practice within a larger health
care system that has increasing levels of complexity
and arguably just as many needs as an individual
patient. In ethics this could be termed a dual moral
agency, because the needs of the system and the needs
of the patient (as well as the needs of the physician) can
at times come into direct conflict. While it can be
uncomfortable to mention the possibility that health
care provision is guided by anything other than the
patients’ best interests, the reality is that decisions in
medicine are guided by a complex array of vari-
ables—of which patient interest and autonomy may be
the most important, but not the only, consideration.
While physicians often consciously minimize this dual-
ity, it is important to recognize that perception is often
more important than reality. The mere appearance of
impropriety can be sufficient to undermine public trust
even in the absence of misconduct, making profession-
alism just as important as legal regulation.
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This review will discuss the federal regulations that
govern the relationship of the physician with the pri-
vate sector and highlight certain high-risk relationships
that have been targeted for review by the Office of the
Inspector General (OIG). The resources available to and
recommendations provided by this investigative branch
of government will be reviewed for several common
business arrangements that physicians may enter into
with industry.
FEDERAL GUIDELINES
The review and enforcement of statutes that regulate
physician–industry interactions falls primarily to the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
Within HHS, the OIG is mandated to protect both the
integrity of HHS programs and the health and welfare
of the beneficiaries of those programs. This broad
mandate is carried out through a nationwide network
of audits, investigations, inspections, and other mis-
sion-related functions performed by OIG components.
The OIG has taken a specific interest in the inter-
actions between physicians and industry since at least
1990, when the American Medical Association (AMA)
filed its report before the House of Delegates regard-
ing its opinion on gifts to physicians from industry.1
Since then the OIG has shown increased interest in
physician–industry interactions, as evidenced by its
communications, published opinions, congressional
testimony, and the federal Compliance Program
Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers pub-
lished in 2003.2–9 These communications demonstrate
an evolving interpretation of, rather than a change in,
existing statutes.
The OIG has at its disposal three primary means of
influencing the physician–industry relationship: the
False Claims Act (FCA), the Federal Anti-Kickback Stat-
ute, and the Civil Monetary Penalties Law. The FCA is
the primary tool used by the OIG in enforcement and,
when linked with the Anti-Kickback Statute, has broad
implications for the health care industry. Certain cus-
toms and practices commonplace in other industries
can be highly suspect in the eyes of the federal govern-
ment when used in the health care sector.
The FCA originated in 1863 when President Lincoln
enacted legislation to pursue unscrupulous defense
contractors during the Civil War. The FCA provides for
substantial monetary penalties for anyone who submits
false or fraudulent claims to the government. This is the
primary tool the OIG uses to investigate and prosecute
health care fraud, with penalties of $5,000 to $11,000
per claim plus three times the damages incurred by the
government, as well as exclusion from federal health
care programs. Since its amendment in 1986, the gov-
ernment has used the FCA to recover in excess of $21
billion for the Treasury Department.10 Of specific note
is that the FCA has within it a whistleblower (or qui
tam) provision that empowers lay people to pursue liti-
gation under the statute with a reward of 15% to 30%
of the amount recovered in the action. Since 2000, 78%
of all fraud settlements or judgments have been initi-
ated by qui tam actions, and 80% of those qui tam
actions have involved health care fraud, often initiated
by former employees or customers of the company in
question.10
The Anti-Kickback Statute was introduced in 1972 to
protect Medicare and Medicaid programs from inap-
propriate utilization and expense, although it was not
successfully linked to the FCA until the 1990s. The fed-
eral Anti-Kickback Statute makes it illegal to knowingly
and willfully offer, solicit, or receive remuneration to
induce the referral of federal health care program busi-
ness. Remuneration has been taken by the courts to
mean anything of value, whether or not the item is used
for patient care or personal gain. It is also important to
note that an arrangement undertaken for lawful and
legitimate purposes is still implicated under the Anti-
Kickback Statute if at least one of its goals is to increase
or induce federal health care program utilization.2 This
statement is far-reaching because common practices,
such as sales incentives, volume pricing and discounts,
physician ownership of companies or patents, and even
medical specialty referrals may be implicated under the
Anti-Kickback Statute.
Although fraud is not normally a concept tied to the
interactions between physicians and industry, the link-
age of the Anti-Kickback Statute to the FCA made these
two statutes the most important to consider when ana-
lyzing any financial or business relationship in health
care. The legal argument that has been upheld in cer-
tain cases is that a request for reimbursement from
Medicare or Medicaid for a service or product obtained
through a kickback scheme constitutes a false claim and
exposes both the giver and the recipient to liability
under the FCA.
To address the concerns that many in the health care
industry have regarding the application of this statute,
the government established, and continues to adapt, a
list of ‘‘safe harbors’’ in common business arrange-
ments which, when followed, limit the risk of prosecu-
tion under the antifraud statutes.11 Among the topics
most relevant to the physician–industry relationship,
these safe harbors cover personal service and manage-
ment contracts, investment or ownership in industry,
employee relationships, and physician referrals. The
OIG strongly recommends that whenever possible,
business arrangements should be constructed to fit
within one of these safe harbors. Failure to do so does
not mean that an arrangement or practice is prohibited,
but the OIG recommends that the following four ques-
tions be asked when considering the potential for pros-
ecution.2 First, does the arrangement or practice have a
potential to interfere with or skew clinical decision-
making? Second, does the arrangement or practice
have a potential to increase the costs to federal health
care programs, beneficiaries, or enrollees? Third, does
the arrangement or practice have a potential to
increase the risk of overutilization or inappropriate uti-
lization? Finally, does the arrangement or practice raise
safety or quality of care concerns?
The combination of the Anti-Kickback Statute and the
FCA has resulted in a number of recent enforcements
that have exposed the darker side of the physician–
industry relationship. The most illustrative is the 1997
investigation of TAP pharmaceuticals, the maker of
Lupron (leuprolide) and a joint venture between Takeda
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Chemical Industries and Abbott Laboratories.12 In a qui
tam action brought by a former TAP employee and
health plan administrator, the OIG discovered that TAP
encouraged urologists to bill Medicare the average
wholesale price of Lupron for samples that were pro-
vided free or at a steeply discounted price by the com-
pany. The company also engaged the urologists as
consultants without specific deliverables, provided
all-expense paid trips, and awarded unrestricted educa-
tional grants. These items were found by the court to
be tantamount to gifts provided by TAP to urologists in
exchange for Lupron prescriptions, which were then
billed to Medicare. In the resultant settlement TAP
agreed to pay the government $875 million in criminal
and civil liabilities, of which the whistleblowers were
awarded almost $100 million.
In 2003, a nearly identical investigation to the Lupron
case charged AstraZeneca with fraud in the marketing of
its cancer drug Zoladex (goserelin). The drug company
provided free or discounted drug to physicians between
1993 and 1996, which was then billed back to Medicare
at a substantially inflated rate. The government also
charged that AstraZeneca provided illegal remuneration
to doctors who agreed to purchase Zolodex, offering
enticements in the form of educational grants, business
assistance grants and services, travel, entertainment, and
consulting services. In the resulting settlement, Astra-
Zeneca agreed to pay $355 million in civil and criminal
liability for providing illegal kickbacks to physicians.
The arrangements in the Zoladex and Lupron cases
occurred prior to the self-regulation promoted by both
industry and physician groups. The Lupron case pro-
vided the impetus for The Pharmaceutical Research
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) Code of Conduct
in 2002, and in 2002 ⁄ 2003 the reformulation of stan-
dards put forth by the AMA and the Accreditation
Council for Continuing Medical Education (ACCME)
changed the way medical societies viewed the physi-
cian–industry interaction.13–15 While these standards
and their presentation before Congress forestalled fur-
ther legislation, they were only able to curtail the most
abusive practices. Recent moves by some state legisla-
tures to make payments to physicians by industry more
transparent by creating a public register have thus far
yielded limited results.16–18
A more recent 2007 settlement totaling $311 million
against four medical device companies that offered ille-
gal kickbacks to physicians to promote the use of ortho-
pedic devices did little to reassure the public that
physicians and industry are capable of self-regulation.9
In this investigation, it came to light that the four device
manufacturers (who controlled 75% of the hip and knee
replacement market) had offered lucrative consulting
arrangements, lavish trips, and other perks to induce
the surgeons to use their prosthetic devices between
2002 and 2006. The consulting agreements were suspect
because they were often drafted by sales representa-
tives and failed to require specific deliverables. In some
arrangements, physicians would receive $5,000 pay-
ments to provide quarterly market reports, operating
room activity reports, and reports on product issues,
many of which were of little or no value to the com-
pany. The companies arranged panel meetings at resort
locations and reimbursed physicians for travel expenses
and compensated them with an additional $5,000 in
consultant fees for their attendance at the conference.
The OIG reported that over the 4-year period, the four
device companies paid $800 million to orthopedic
surgeons in royalties and fees. The OIG has an ongoing
investigation into the details behind these payments
using information provided by the companies as part of
the settlement agreement.19
The final tool at the disposal of the OIG is the Civil
Monetary Penalties Law (CMP). This law can be used to
enforce the Anti-Kickback Statute and provides for
monetary penalties of up to $50,000 for each illegal act,
assessments of up to three times the amount of the
kickback, and exclusion from participation in federal
health care programs. The CMP can be an attractive
alternative to the FCA since it is tried before an HHS
administrative law judge and the rules of evidence are
more relaxed. As an example of the law’s use, in July
2007 the OIG entered into a $2.95 million CMP settle-
ment with Advanced Neuromodulation Systems, Inc.
(ANS), over their payment of $5,000 to neurosurgeons
as a ‘‘data collection fee’’ for every five new patients
tested with the device.9 The OIG alleged that the pro-
gram provided no significant clinical value but was
merely a marketing tool to increase sales, that the pro-
gram was developed by ANS’s Vice President of Sales
and Marketing, that the fee was not set through fair
market value, and that the clinical research department
of ANS did not use the data.
The limited resources of the OIG are typically tar-
geted against major device and pharmaceutical compa-
nies rather than individual physicians, although the
statutes specifically provide for criminal and civil penal-
ties against persons who accept kickbacks from indus-
try. The OIG has specifically stated that enforcement
targeting manufacturers has not been sufficient in limit-
ing fraud and that medical professionals (surgeons in
particular) need to be directly targeted to enhance
enforcement of the existing statutes. As part of this
strategy, in 2008 the OIG entered into a $1.5 million set-
tlement with an Arkansas neurosurgeon who had
agreed to split the commissions with sales representa-
tives for products used both during and after surgery
on his patients.9 Using information obtained from the
settlement with the four orthopedic device companies
in 2007, the OIG has issued subpoenas to unnamed
surgeons to further their fraud investigations.19
One other activity that physicians commonly partici-
pate in at the request of industry is product endorse-
ment. Product endorsement may come in the form of
direct advertising or more often in the form of contin-
uing education sponsored by a device or drug com-
pany. In either event, such physician presentations are
viewed as marketing activities and as such fall under
regulation by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act that
prohibits unapproved (or off-label) marketing. Although
a physician may prescribe a drug or device for any indi-
cation he or she sees fit, to promote a drug or device
without the blessing of the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) exposes the sponsoring company to liability
under the FCA. It is important to recognize that physi-
cians paid by industry in this capacity are employees of
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the company (whether contractual or statutory) and are
therefore restricted as agents of the company when dis-
cussing off-label uses and are bound to adhere to com-
pany policy when it comes to the topic of off-label
marketing.
The topic of off-label marketing remains at issue
between the government and industry, with the guar-
anteed right of free speech on one side and the ability
of the FDA to effectively regulate device and drug
manufacturers on the other. Every case reviewed that
involved an issue of off-label marketing and has been
prosecuted under the FCA and has been decided on
the basis of whether the information provided in the
marketing campaign was itself fraudulent (and not
simply because it was not approved by the FDA).
Pfizer Inc. agreed in 2004 to a settlement because of
‘‘aggressive marketing’’ of off-label uses for Neurontin
(gabapentin), including chronic pain, migraine head-
ache, bipolar disorder, and attention deficit disorder.20
Pfizer was charged by the government with manipulat-
ing the flow of scientific information, by delaying or
suppressing studies that failed to demonstrate efficacy,
generating ghost-written studies in support of off-label
indications, and using sloppy science to gain market-
ing position. The settlement of $430 million amounts
to a fraction of the sales of Neurontin, which had
risen to $2.7 billion (94% for off-label uses) annually
by 2003. Physicians were involved in all aspects of this
marketing campaign whether or not they knew it was
fraudulent.
Another notable case of fraud created by off-label
marketing practices was brought against AbTox
(decided in 2008) and had both the CEO and the com-
pliance officer facing individual criminal prosecution. In
this case the jury was specifically instructed by the
court not to provide a guilty verdict on the basis of off-
label product promotion and ultimately voted to convict
because the individuals willfully, knowingly, and repeat-
edly lied to the FDA and then ignored repeated
demands to desist, resulting in harm to patients that
the company also failed to report to the FDA.21 A more
recent case was brought in a qui tam action by former
marketing managers against Scios and its parent com-
pany Johnson & Johnson for fraudulent off-label mar-
keting of Natrecor (nesiritide). Specifically, Natrecor
was approved in 2001 for use in acute decompensated
congestive heart failure (CHF) over a 36-hour infusion,
but Scios soon began an aggressive campaign market-
ing the outpatient use of Natrecor for CHF during
serial scheduled visits over less than 6 hours, for which
physicians billed a considerable amount to Medicaid
and Medicare. In 2005, a panel of leading cardiologists
advised Scios that it should stop promoting Natrecor
for use in outpatient scheduled visits, which Scios did
when they acknowledged in a letter to health care pro-
viders in 2005 that clinical evidence was lacking for
both safety and efficacy in this off-label use. A Scios-
sponsored study published in 2007 showed no benefit
in using serial outpatient Natrecor infusions.22 The 2008
whistleblower lawsuits initiated under the FCA against
Scios were joined in February 2009 by the Department
of Justice after an investigation by HHS, OIG, FBI,
FDA, and the Veterans Administration. The implications
for the physicians who participated in these marketing
campaigns remain to be fully explored.
All of these civil and criminal actions are unlikely to
stop or even slow the aggressive marketing practices
that some drug and device manufacturers use and
involve physicians in. Consider the recent settlement
of $1.42 billion that Eli Lily Co. agreed to pay in 2009
for the illegal marketing of Zyprexa (olanzapine),
which included the largest criminal fine in history in
the amount of $515 million. This staggering settlement
of $1.42 billion is approximately the amount Medicare
and Medicaid programs pay for the use of Zyprexa
annually, and the annual worldwide revenue for
Zyprexa was $3.5 billion through three quarters of
2008. Although fraud settlements arising from illegal
marketing can amount to little more than the cost of
doing business for a drug or device company, a physi-
cian might want to carefully consider the ramifications




The cases listed above are meant to be illustrative and
not exhaustive of the types of abuses investigated by
the OIG. The underlying tone is not meant to be
anti-industry, as the collaboration between physicians
and industry has been a largely successful one that
has been marred over the years by a few cases of
apparent fraud. The OIG acknowledges that the rela-
tionship between physicians and industry is necessary,
but advocates that it should be conducted with greater
transparency. To this end, it has authored guidelines
in the form of a compliance program, endorsed safe
harbors that limit liability for common business
arrangements when followed, and established an
advisory program whereby specific arrangements or
practices can receive formal legal review and
recommendations from the OIG. These formal reviews
are posted on the OIG’s Web site in the form of
advisory opinions that are available as an additional
source of guidance, although they confer specific
immunity from prosecution only for the poster of the
original question.
In the past 5 years the OIG has issued two advisory
opinions that directly impact the physician–industry
relationship.6,7 Both opinions dealt with market surveys
conducted on behalf of pharmaceutical companies that
targeted physicians directly. In one, the physician was
compensated $1 for answering a series of four to six
questions, and in the other, the physician respondent
chose a favorite charity to receive a donation. In both
cases, the OIG was critical of the fact that such survey
research was a thinly veiled marketing campaign and
suggested that both forms of remuneration had inher-
ent risks of liability under the Anti-Kickback Statute.
However, the OIG concluded in both cases that the
practices were not actionable, in the first case because
the dollar amount (maximum of $12 ⁄ year ⁄ physician)
was insignificant to invoke the statute and in the second
case the use of bona fide charities over which the phy-
sicians had no personal control or interest provided
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a sufficient safeguard to permit the practice. These
opinions are perhaps most useful for illustrating the
skepticism with which the OIG views ‘‘paid to listen’’
marketing arrangements, whether veiled as research or
as education.
When evaluating potential or existing arrangements
with industry, the OIG reminds physicians to be famil-
iar with the safe harbor applicable to their activities.
The published safe harbors include many activities
that a physician can be involved with, such as invest-
ment interests, leasing of space, equipment rentals,
personal services and management contracts, the sale
of a medical practice, waiver of beneficiary coinsur-
ance and deductible amounts, and practitioner recruit-
ment in medically underserved areas. The OIG
recommends that when working with an industry
sponsor, the physician would be best protected if he
or she created an arrangement whereby the physician
is either a true employee of the company or a bona
fide consultant who provides meaningful work at fair
market value. The safe harbor that directly addresses
the consultant contract has seven specific require-
ments that must be followed to reduce the risk of
impropriety. Chief among these requirements is that
the consultant hold a written contract that specifies
exactly what the service being provided is, how often
it is provided, at what rate, that this rate is set to
reflect fair market value, and that the contract is for a
term of not less than 1 year. The OIG further implies
that consulting jobs originating from the sales and
marketing division of a company deserve additional
scrutiny and are best handled in the statutory
employer–employee capacity. The underlying theme
that runs through the OIG recommendations is that
fee-for-service arrangements must be reasonable for
the task performed and provide a legitimate value to
the company (aside from merely generating business)
and that the performance of this service must be governed
by a written contract that is reviewed periodically to
ensure completion.
Roughly 50% of continuing medical education
(CME) is currently supported by the private sector, a
reality that is unlikely to change in the current
economy.23 The OIG guidelines specifically acknowl-
edge both the crucial role that a physician plays in
conducting clinical research and the educational
activities sponsored by industry sources. Physicians
are advised to scrutinize the nature of educational or
research grants to ensure that they are not based
expressly or implicitly on referral of the manufac-
turer’s product. Research grants arising from the sales
and marketing divisions of industry (postmarketing)
should be viewed with skepticism if the only discern-
ible scientific objective is to increase the sales of the
device or drug. It is incumbent upon organizers of
educational activities to ensure that industry sponsors
have no direct control over the content of the information
provided at a CME event. The OIG guidelines specifically
mention that industry funding for educational activities
sponsored and organized by professional medical orga-
nizations raise little risk of fraud or abuse if the grant is
unrestricted or not conditioned with respect to content
or faculty.2
CONCLUSIONS
It is impossible for practicing physicians to insulate
themselves from the private device and pharmaceuti-
cal sectors. The private sector is pervasive in the daily
activities of a physician’s practice, funding of clinical
research, and physician education. The physician who
enters into a more formal business arrangement with
industry would be well counseled to become familiar
with the regulations and recommendations set forthby
the OIG that inform and influence the physician–
industry relationship. Unfortunately, the recommenda-
tion that formal relationships between physicians and
industry be governed by the guidelines outlined by
the OIG, PhRMA, AMA, and ACCME did not prevent
the recent associations that ended in civil and criminal
liabilities. It remains to be seen if the even stricter
guidelines recently endorsed by the Association of
American Medical Colleges will have any more influ-
ence.24 The fact remains that all of the causes of
action investigated by the OIG were already prohib-
ited by the code of conduct presented by PhRMA, the
OIG, and all major medical organizations. Stricter self-
regulatory guidelines may continue to be ineffective
when no provision or recommendation for effective
monitoring or enforcement accompanies the guide-
lines. To have any effect, these guidelines will at least
require monitoring and enforcement at the institu-
tional level or by professional medical societies. Prose-
cution of individual physicians has been rare to date,
but will likely increase in an effort to curtail fraud and
abuse.
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Deb Diercks, MD, University of California, Davis Medical
Center
Benjamin Friedman, MD, Joshua Goldstein, MD, and
Edward Jauch, MD, Medical University of South
Carolina
Howard A. Klausner, MD, Henry Ford Hospital
David A. Kramer, MD, York Hospital
Todd Larabee, MD, University of Colorado Health
Sciences Center
Richard M. Nowak, MD, Henry Ford Hospital
Ali S. Raja, MD, MBA, Brigham and Women’s Hospital
Nathan Shapiro, MD, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical
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